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For Russia, the Balkan states rate a high regional priority.   From
a geopolitical view, the region’s problems are an unremitting
threat to European and, by extension, world stability.
Many of the regions’ animosities are ages old and obdurate.
To these are added new problems, mainly recent and internal,
such as a plethora of refugees that have a dangerous, destabiliz-
ing effect on the area.
For this and other concerns, the Balkans are a point of ten-
derness for European security, provoking new challenges for the
continent.  So a long-term objective must be the integration of sta-
ble Balkan states into mainstream Europe.
The international  community must find the means to prevent
new conflicts.  The EU, NATO, and the countries of the region
must play a positive stabilizing role.  The reputations  of  European
organizations and their officials are at stake. 
The outbreak of violence along  Macedonia’s  northern
boarder with Kosovo, along with trouble in southern Serbia and
continuing unrest within Kosovo,  did not come as a nasty surprise
to Russian experts. They easily noted that the main problems of the
region had not been solved by the NATO bombing.  
Let me emphasize here the importance of non-military meas-
ures for the  management of conflicts. At  the critical early stage
of conflict,  all non-military means and pressure (economic, diplo-
matic) must be applied. Nevertheless, how effective this approach
is remains a question. 
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At the same time, the means to respond to this new genera-
tion of threats to European security must be in place.  These are
mainly soft security, yet the responses will have consequences
affecting peace and stability in Europe.
NATO-Russia cooperation in peacekeeping and crisis man-
agement in the Balkans dates from 1995 and the creation of IFOR
for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Russian forces joined IFOR in January
1996 and continue to contribute to SFOR. Russian participation
in SFORII consists of 1,300 men of a total of 20,000 (following
the 1999/2000 restructuring and reduction of troops). 
Russian participation in KFOR in Kosovo consists since 1999
of 3,000 men (less than 10% of the total), who are deployed in
zones of Russian responsibility in the northern part of the American
sector along the border with Serbia, the southern part of the
French sector, and in the northern German sector.  There is a
Russian Headquarters in the British zone (at Velne), a Russian base
at the Pristina international airport, and a military hospital.  No
Russian soldiers are in the Italian sector.
Russian participation in SFOR and KFOR is through special
arrangements  between NATO and Russia. Russia does not par-
ticipate in planning or decision-making. Like other non-NATO
forces, Russian troops take orders from SFOR and KFOR com-
manders via their respective multinational divisional headquarters.
There are Russian liaison officers at SHAPE. Thus, in SFOR the
First Russian Separate Airborne Brigade (in Ugljevik) operates
under Russian command but is under the tactical control of the
US-led Multinational Division (North). 
The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council follows the NATO-
Russia Founding Act of May 1997. The two sides agreed to con-
sult on a wide range of security issues, including peacekeeping,
international terrorism, military strategy, and nuclear doctrine. 
The NATO air campaign of March-June 1999 against
Yugoslavia caused Russia to withdraw from the Founding Act
when the air-strikes began. In July 1999, meetings of the PJC
resumed, but discussion was restricted to cooperation in peace-
keeping operations, in particular the NATO-led Kosovo force
KFOR, which Russia joined. In early 2000, NATO Secretary
George Robertson and Russian President Putin met and both indi-
cated a clear interest in improving relations. Soon after that the
PJC resumed its regular meeting schedule. 
Now to be decided is how to proceed in the future, how to
develop cooperation between NATO and Russia in conflict man-
agement, and establishing the role of the PJC.  SFOR and KFOR
are a success story of cooperation between Russian and NATO
troops.  There may be political disagreement at the top, but on the
ground  there is a common understanding of the security prob-
lems. 18
Crisis management denotes long-term engagement. The
results of this cooperation are positive;  relations with NATO have
improved,  but some frustration remains on the Russian side.
Russian representatives consider that their views are ignored by
the NATO Commander.  NATO has avoided the issue of the
returning Serbian forces to Kosovo. Nevertheless, Russia and
NATO support the return of the Serb minority population to
Kosovo and its protection.  The wider task of fighting chaos,
crime, drug-trafficking, and the spread of Islamic extremism in
Europe must become a priority for Russia-NATO cooperation.
PJC could strengthen its institutional basis by creating a perma-
nent secretariat and a new  cooperative framework, so that Russia
could participate in the planning and management of NATO
operations.  
The EU crisis-management force is in the making; it will be a
division of labor between the US and Europe-EU, the latter con-
centrating mainly on soft security tasks. I support cooperation
between a future EU crisis management force and Russia. In this
context, both parties decide where and how such a force will be
used as the EU becomes more engaged in Southeastern Europe.
It is also necessary to consider a possible US reduction of its
military presence  in Bosnia or a general withdrawal of its troops
from Bosnia . The existence of Bosnia, and its becoming a demo-
cratic, multiethnic state, depends on fulfilling  the Dayton agree-
ment.  Some suppose that if troops are withdrawn from Bosnia,
Bosnia will fall apart.  But are the Europeans responsible for
developing a peace-keeping force, completely replacing the US
forces?  The EU countries  have not expressed enthusiasm; such
an outcome causes only concern in Europe. 
After a withdrawal of  American troops from Bosnia or their
reduction, would Bosnia remain under NATO control or be trans-
ferred to the EU?  Could OSCE provide leadership in managing
operations in Bosnia? If so, this would allow the participation of
all parties in the Bosnian operation, including non-members of
the EU. 1995 arrangements concerning Russian participation in
SFOR could be redefined. SFOR could be transformed.
The Kosovo problem can be resolved by implementing the
UN Security Council Resolution 1244; by unequivocally support-
ing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia; and by
assuring autonomy for Kosovo as an integral part of the country.
In the present situation, NATO needs to assume a tougher stance
towards the KLA Albanian militants. 
Without a stable, democratic, and multiethnic Yugoslavia,
there can be no stability in the Balkans. Yugoslavia should
become a base of its stability and security. The full integration of
Yugoslavia into the international community would be achieved by
lifting all remaining sanctions - including the embargo on arms19
imports. Now more than ever, Yugoslav leadership and institutions
of power need the understanding and aid of the international
community; only then can the continuity of the political and eco-
nomic transformation of FR Yugoslavia be assured. 
Negotiating the future status of Kosovo will begin after the
scheduled elections in Kosovo in November, 2001.  The mission
of the international community is to force  Kosovar politicians to
play  a positive role in stabilizing the region.  Wider autonomy with
political integration of Kosovo within Yugoslavia would be optimal
despite the opposition of the radical wing of the Albanian Kosovar
community. Any other scenarios can only elevate the extremism of
the Macedonian  Albanians.
Now is the time for every state and the international commu-
nity to decide whether they support those who want to build a
democratic, multiethnic Yugoslavia, or those who spread ethnic
division. 
The international community must admit that in Kosovo,
southern Serbia, and Macedonia evidence of international terror-
ism abounds, and firm barriers must be in place to prevent anoth-
er explosion in the Balkans. After NATO’s bombing campaign in
1999 and the arrival of KFOR and UNMIK, Kosovo has become
a hotbed of terrorism.
Macedonia faces pressure from the most openly extreme
Albanian circles, unquestionably the source and cause of insecu-
rity in the Balkans.  Macedonian security is guaranteed by NATO;
so it is the international community’s responsibility to curb nation-
alism in the region.  It can start by not implying - directly or indi-
rectly – that forming new states is even a remote hope. 
Terrorism must be decisively opposed, for its nature and
essence have distinctly changed. Under the verbal tent of “nation-
alism” congregate criminal anti-social elements and groups.   But
these extremists will not succeed in staging a repeat Kosovo
adventure.
Today’s extremists  are attempting to provoke the Yugoslav
and Macedonian governments to use force against ethnic
Albanians; they hope that the western media will again raise the
question of  non-proportional use of force,  ethnic cleansing, and
civilian casualties. But it is now clear to the world that the actions
of the terrorists do not enhance or promote the interests of the
peoples who live in these areas.  Nevertheless, attempts to nego-
tiate the end of armed violence seem only to further radical, ter-
rorist activity.
The international community faces problems not only affect-
ing the future of the Balkans but also the security of  Europe:  that
is, how to stop the violence, the ethnic cleansing, the multiple
civilian catastrophes, and the flood of refugees?  The solutions are
not in unrestricted bombing or a massive military presence. New20
approaches that stress and reflect the political will of the countries
involved are in order, actively supported by the international com-
munity.
To achieve this, Moscow proposes that regional states be
responsible for assuring strict respect for the basic principles of
international relations which are incorporated in the UN
Constitution; such as recognizing the equality of states and
respecting territorial integrity; the disuse of force, and an intoler-
ance of use of one’s territory for the organization, support, or par-
ticipation in military, semi-military, or terrorist activities. This doc-
ument  could be attached to the OSCE as an annex to the Stability
Pact in the SEE.  Implementing this proposal would change the
Balkans from a center of tension and turmoil into a region of
peace, stability, and prosperity.
What other risks, threats, and challenges to European securi-
ty now exist in the Balkans?  The political risks are characterized
by the incompetence and backwardness of democratic institutes.
Some countries  can be described in modern political science as
“failed states”; the central authority cannot effectively control the
country.  When analyzing Balkan events the emphasis should be
on the problem of  central authority .  Only in stable environments
can the new Balkan states complete economic changes and
become a presence in the marketplace.  At present, the states are
dependent on foreign credit, technology, and power resources.
The societal risks are caused by the generally low standard of
living of a large part of the population. Unemployment and eco-
nomic emigration have reached a high level.  Add to this the eco-
nomic burden of supporting a flood of refugees. 
Regional cooperation is linked directly to European integra-
tion.  The people of the peninsula see themselves as a part of
Europe. 
There are a host of regional and sub-regional initiatives that
are designed both to boost regional cooperation, and hasten
accession to the EU. Russia participates in these: the SEE Stability
Pact (full participation); the process of cooperation of the SEE
states (Russia is invited as observer to the meetings of ministers of
foreign affairs); the Black Sea economic cooperation (full partici-
pation); the cooperative initiative for SEE - SECI (participation).
Russia is a guarantor of the Dayton  agreements, the negotiator
under article V of appendix 1-A Dayton concerning stabilization in
former Yugoslavia and its environs. 
The range of Russian participation covers maintaining securi-
ty and cooperation in the region and taking part in its economic
reconstruction.
In the area of energy power, the Balkan countries traditional-
ly import Russian fuel and other energy resources.
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Russian oil YUKOS signed a $20-million contract with JANAF
to upgrade the Adria pipeline and integrate it with the Druzhba
pipeline.  The new company, YUKOS-Adria, will carry out the
project, which will result in the export of  five million tons a year
of Russian crude oil via Belarus and Ukraine through Slovakia,
Hungary, and the deep-water port at Omisalj. YUKOS has guar-
anteed 2.5 million tons (50,000 bbl/d) for the pipeline; this will
give Russian exporters a direct route to world markets via the
Adriatic Sea, bypassing the congested Bosporus Straits. 
Croatia is a stable, reliable political and economic partner of
Russia in the region.  Intensive political dialogue at different lev-
els between Russia and Croatia now exist and are expanding.
Bilateral documents were signed, the major one being a mutual
declaration of friendship and cooperation (1998).
Concerning trade and economic cooperation with Russia
(about 700 million dollars), Croatia plays the leading role among
the countries of former Yugoslavia. This figure could increase to
one billion dollars in the near future, given the Croatian potential
in the areas of telecommunication equipment, shipbuilding, phar-
maceuticals, construction, and tourism.
The main objectives of bilateral relations are these:
To develop regular political dialogue with the Balkan coun-
tries based on international law, common interests, and mutual
respect. 
To intensify the participation of intergovernmental committees
and commissions so as to heighten their success in resolving cur-
rent issues.
To maximize the mutual benefits that accrue from Soviet /
Russian technology and  technical  support. 
To expand traditional historic ties with the Balkan countries,
especially in  science and culture.
To employ the skills of the Russian Ministry on Emergencies in
solving specific regional problems.  
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